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I. Introduction
The growth in prescription drug advertising in recent years has raised questions as to whether such advertising
tends to lead to more or less informed decisions by patients and health care professionals. Pharmaceutical
companies claim that advertisements help doctors with limited time keep abreast of important developments
that could beneﬁt their patients and empower consumers to participate more knowledgeably in health care
decisions, all of which tends to improve public health. Consumer advocates respond that advertisements
often provide incomplete, misleading, or outright false information, and lead doctors and consumers to choose
drugs that are less eﬀective, more dangerous, and more expensive than other drugs or non-drug treatment
alternatives.
The Food and Drug Agency (FDA) has primary responsibility for ensuring the accuracy of prescription drug
advertisements, but to date it has failed adequately to protect the public from the dangers of such advertising,
and has thus also prevented the emergence of its possible beneﬁts. The FDA only regulates advertisements
after they have run, often too late to correct the misinformation that unlawful advertisements promote.
Furthermore, it appears that the FDA only takes action against a fraction of the unlawful advertisements
that actually run. The enormous public conﬁdence that the FDA enjoys exacerbates the ill eﬀects of under-
1regulation; the public assumes that because the FDA regulates these advertisements, they must all be
accurate, or at least much more so than most advertising.
The current system has two primary ﬂaws: a failure to regulate advertisements before they run, and a
lack of suﬃcient resources to carry out the FDA’s regulatory mandate. Pre-approval would prevent the
promulgation of false or misleading information (and the costs of correcting it), promote accurate information,
and create greater incentives for pharmaceutical companies to make their advertisements more honest from
the beginning. However, pre-approval would be more resource-intensive than the current regime, and even
under that regime the FDA does not have the resources to detect and take action (much less forceful, eﬀective
action) against all or even most unlawful advertisements. At the same time, the beneﬁts of improved public
health likely outweigh the costs of additional enforcement resources.
Even if pre-approval constitutes good policy, however, the FDA must regulate in a manner that does not
violate commercial speech protections under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. In
recent decades, the Supreme Court has subjected regulation of truthful advertising to a form of intermediate
scrutiny, and has been hostile to many forms of commercial speech regulation. The FDA in particular has
run afoul of commercial speech requirements on a number of occasions.1
As this Article will show, the FDA can subject prescription drug advertisements to pre-approval without
1See, e.g., Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002) (striking down as violative of the First
Amendment a Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 provision that exempted “compounded drugs” from the FDA’s
standard drug approval process, so long as the producers of those drugs refrained from advertising or promoting them); Pearson
v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 658–60 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the FDA could only choose suppression of a dietary supplement
“health claim” for which there was not “signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement,” rather than inclusion of the claim on the product
label along with an appropriate disclaimer, if it could establish that there was no less restrictive alternative to protect public
health).
2violating the First Amendment. In fact, such a regime would advance commercial speech doctrine’s goal of
ensuring consumer access to accurate information. Part II of this Article explains the concerns that prescrip-
tion drug advertising raises. Part III summarizes the current regulatory regime, and Part IV summarizes
relevant First Amendment doctrine. Part V discusses the outlines of a pre-approval regime and the policy
issues surrounding it. Part VI explains why such a regime would be consistent with the First Amendment.
Part VII concludes.
II. The Costs and Beneﬁts of Prescription Drug Advertising
A.
Historical and Current Trends in Prescription Drug Advertising.
Until the 1980s, prescription drug advertising aimed almost exclusively at prescribers, although promotion
methods have changed over time. Traditionally, pharmaceutical companies relied on advertising in medical
journals, the eﬀorts of a strong sales force, and provision of direct mail information to make physicians and
other health care professionals aware of their products and to promote interest in prescribing them.2 In
recent decades, the industry has dramatically expanded its promotion arsenal, relying on such methods as
newspaper articles, television talk show interviews, traveling road shows, medical journal supplements, and
press conferences.3 The FDA has expressed concern about this expansion into arenas where the promotional
2See Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-To-Consumer Promotion, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 489, 491 (1999).
3Speech by Kenneth R. Feather, Acting Director, FDA Division of Drug Advertising and Labeling, before the Annual Meeting
3aspect may be just as real, but less apparent.4
The scope of promotional eﬀorts toward health care professionals is quite remarkable. Although DTC
advertisement has grown dramatically, it still only makes up between 14 and 15 % of the pharmaceutical
industry’s promotional budget, and the remainder targets professionals.5 A recent study by Rosenthal et al.
discusses the breakdown of pharmaceutical industry spending on various kinds of promotion to professionals.6
It reports that other literature found that sponsorship of meetings and events constituted 12 % to 15 % of
marketing activities targeting health care professionals.7 In 2000, the industry spent $4.038 billion on oﬃce-
based promotion, $765 million on hospital-based promotion, $484 million on journal advertising, and $7.954
billion on free samples, for a total of $13.241 billion.8 Of these four types of promotion, journal advertising
was the only one that did not exhibit signiﬁcant growth over the period from 1996 to 2000.9 The ratio
between overall promotion and sales remained fairly constant between 1996 and 2000, with the relative
proportion devoted to DTC advertising increasing and the relative proportion devoted to the four types of
non-DTC promotion Rosenthal et al. discuss decreasing.10
The most substantial area of growth in promotion targeting health care professionals has been within the
sales force. Between 1994 and 1998 the sales force of the top forty pharmaceutical companies grew from
35,000 full-time sales representatives and supervisors to over 56,000, with the latter ﬁgure representing one
of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America Marketing Section, Mar. 14, 1989 (on ﬁle with the author).
4See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (Sept. 12, 1991) (statement of David A. Kessler, M.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs) (“Selected
promotional practices have gotten out of hand. We are particularly concerned about the increased prevalence of new forms
of promotion – such as promotional events labeled as scientiﬁc and technical seminars, special journal supplements and video
news releases.”)
5See Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Promotion of Prescription Drugs to Consumers, 346 New Engl. J. Med. 498, 498–99
(2002). Rosenthal et al. actually ﬁnd that DTC advertising constitutes nearly 16 % of the total spending on the promotional
budget items they consider, but as they note, they do not consider meetings and events, which other published data indicate
make up 12 % to 15 % of the industry’s non-DTC promotional budget. Id. at 499. Factoring this in brings the DTC ﬁgure to
14.2 % or 14.5 %, respectively.
6Rosenthal et al., supra note 5.
7Id. at 499.
8Id. at 499 tbl. 1.
9See id.
10See id.
4salesperson and $100,000 per eleven doctors in the country.11 Those representatives made an estimated 23.7
million oﬃce and hospital calls per year, as of the year 2000.12 Congress and the FDA have a long history of
concern about the tactics of detailers, particularly their tendency to provide unbalanced presentations and
to promote uses for a drug that have not gained FDA approval.13
However, the real story of the last two decades is the dramatic rise of DTC advertising. The ﬁrst direct-to-
consumer (DTC) print advertisement appeared in 1981.14 After the FDA ended a brief voluntary moratorium
to study the issues raised by DTC advertising,15 such advertising grew at a remarkable rate. DTC spending
grew from $12 million in 1989 to $2.38 billion in 2001.16 Between 1996 and 2000, DTC advertising practically
doubled as a percentage of the pharmaceutical industry’s promotional budget.17 In 2000, 64 % of the
industry’s DTC advertising budget went to television advertising.18 Television advertisement grew by a
factor of seven between 1996 and 2000, whereas DTC print advertisements “only” grew by 56 %.19
However, most of the current advertising is conﬁned to a few therapeutic classes: those that treat conditions
11Abigail Zuger, Fever Pitch: Getting Doctors to Prescribe Is Big Business, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1999, at A1.
1265 Fed. Reg. 81,082, 81,108 (Dec. 22, 2000).
13See, e.g., Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-293, 102 Stat. 95 (1988) (strictly limiting the practice
of leaving drug samples with prescribers); Marketing and Promotional Practices of the Pharmaceutical Industry: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1990) (question by Sen. Kennedy)
(“How in the world is FDA going to really know whether ...[detailers] are giving a balanced or a tipped presentation, which
obviously as sales representatives, they’ve got a ﬁnancial interest in whether these products are going to go?”); Examination
of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973–74: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 93rd Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 141 (Dec. 18, 1973–May 4, 1974) (statement of Senator Gaylord Nelson) (“daily,
personal, face-to-face meetings with individual doctors ...are the most powerful communication mechanism, and the drug
industry devotes at least $700 million (seven- tenths of total advertising and promotion expenditures) to this activity.”); id.
at 186, 765, 771, 791 (testimony of former sales representatives and other witnesses about the high pressure on detailers to
sell, and the resulting under-emphasis on side eﬀects and use of “gifts and gimmicks” to win over physicians and their staﬀs);
Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on
Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3506 (1968) (testimony of Dr. Robert McCleery, Acting Deputy Director of the FDA’s
Bureau of Medicine) (describing how one company told its sales force to de-emphasize serious side eﬀects and other warnings for
an anti-inﬂammatory drug and to encourage physicians to use it for unapproved uses). The FDA has engaged in such actions
as contacting sales representatives for information, seeking access to internal detailer training manuals and other materials, and
the launch of a toll-free hotline for reporting of promotional abuses. See F-D-C Rep. (“The Pink Sheet”), June 17, 1991, at
10; F-D-C Rep. (“The Pink Sheet”), May 27, 1991, at T & G 1.
14See Feather, supra note 3.
15The FDA called for a moratorium in 1983, see FDA Statement of Policy, Sept. 2, 1983, and ended it in 1985, see 50 Fed.
Reg. 36,677 (Sept. 9, 1985).
16See 21 Med. Ad. News 44–45 tbl., 48 tbl. (June 2002).
17Rosenthal et al., supra note 5, at 499.
18See id.
19See Rosenthal et al., supra note 5, at 500 tbl. 1.
5whose symptoms consumers can recognize easily (e.g. arthritis, seasonal allergies, and obesity); those that
treat chronic, often undiagnosed diseases (e.g. high cholesterol, osteoporosis, and depression); and those that
enhance quality of life (such as treatments for skin conditions or hair loss).20 In 2000, 20 drugs accounted
for 58.8 % of all industry DTC advertising.21 This is in stark contrast to promotion targeting health care
professionals, which is used for almost all brand-name drugs.22
The rise of DTC advertising has a great deal to do with a general trend toward increased patient participation
in decisions aﬀecting their health, accompanied by increased patient access to medical information.23 This
trend has several causes. First, in the 1960s, the FDA developed the concept of Patient Package Inserts,
information included with prescription drugs that would provide patients with information about the use
and risks of those drugs, and began requiring them for certain drugs.24 The trend increased in the 1970s.25
The obvious intent of the policy was to protect consumers, but it also had an empowering eﬀect. Second,
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, consumers began to gain easier access to information about diseases and
prescription drugs.26 Signiﬁcantly, the Physicians’ Desk Reference and the U.S. Pharmacoepia’s book on
prescription drugs became available to consumers at this time, and the news media began to cover more
20Alan F. Holmer, Direct-To-Consumer Advertising – Strengthening Our Health Care System, 346 New Engl. J. Med. 526,
527 (2002); see Rosenthal et al., supra note 5, at 501 tbl. 2 (listing the twenty most-advertised drugs, most of which ﬁt into
the categories Holmer suggests).
21Rosenthal et al., supra note 5, at 501 tbl. 2. In order from most-promoted to least, those drugs were Vioxx, Prilosec,
Claritin, Paxil, Zocor, Viagra, Celebrex, Flonase, Allegra, Meridia, Flovent, Pravachol, Zyrtec, Singuair, Lipitor, Nasonex,
Ortho Tri-Cyclen, Valtrex, Lamisil, and Prempro. Id.
22Id. at 501.
23Francis B. Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins, The Development of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising Regula-
tion, 57 Food & Drug L.J. 423, 424 (2002); Holmer, supra note 20, at 527.
24See Pines, supra note 2, at 489–90. For examples of PPI regulations, see 21 C.F.R. § 201.305 (2002) (isoproterenol inhalation
products); id. § 310.501 (oral contraceptives); id. § 310.515 (estrogens). The FDA had planned a mandatory pilot program to
test the viability of requiring PPIs for all prescription drugs, see 47 Fed. Reg. 7200 (Feb. 17, 1982), but it ultimately withdrew
the ﬁnal regulation and turned away from the development of a PPI regime, see id. at 39,147, 39,147 (Sept. 7, 1982).
25Pines, supra note 2, at 490.
26Id. at 490–91.
6health stories.27 Third, the many innovations in drug technology tended to generate increased consumer
interest in prescription drugs.28 Finally, the signiﬁcant advances in medical technology at the time changed
the nature of the doctor-patient relationship.29
The emergence of First Amendment protection for commercial speech in a line of Supreme Court cases
beginning in 197630 may also have made it easier for drug companies to begin DTC advertising. It is possible
that drug companies refrained from DTC advertising in part out of fear of regulatory reprisal, but the new
commercial speech doctrine placed limits on the federal government’s power to regulate advertising, and thus
reduced the regulatory risks for companies taking the bold step of advertising to consumers. Indeed, Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council31 predicted that
the Court’s new commercial speech doctrine would lead to “active promotion of prescription drugs, liquor,
cigarettes and other products the use of which it has previously been thought desirable to discourage.”32
Whatever the causes of the rise of DTC advertising may be, it has now become commonplace, and even con-
sumer advocates acknowledge that an outright ban on it would violate the First Amendment.33 Questions
remain, however, as to how prescription drug advertising impacts health care professionals, patients, and
the relationship between them, and as to how the FDA should regulate such advertising.
27Id.
28Id. at 491.
29Id.
30See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. V. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
31425 U.S. 748 (1976).
32Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist demonstrated remarkable prescience in suggesting several ads that
a hypothetical pharmacist might now run: “‘Pain getting you down? Insist that your physician prescribe Demerol. You pay a
little more than for aspirin, but you get a lot more relief.’ ‘Can’t shake the ﬂu? Get a prescription for tetracycline from your
doctor today.’ ‘Don’t spend another sleepless night. Ask your doctor to prescribe Seconal without delay.”’ Id. at 788.
33See Sidney M. Wolfe, Direct-To-Consumer Advertising – Education or Emotion Promotion?, 346 New Engl. J. Med.
524, 526 (2002).
7B.
General Framework For Analyzing the Eﬀects of Advertising
There is considerable dispute as to the eﬀects of prescription drug advertising.
While there are many unique features to the prescription drug context, it makes sense to begin by examining
the primary theories of human behavior that underlie more general debates about the eﬀects of advertising.
Two of the most prominent frameworks for analyzing advertising and other economic phenomena are ra-
tional choice theory and behavioral economic theory. Rational choice economic theory presumes that every
human being is a rational maximizer of his own utility.34 Although utility theory can serve as a simplifying
assumption in order to make potentially useful predictions about economic phenomena, economists, political
scientists, sociologists, and most especially legal scholars often go further and treat it as “normatively binding
and descriptively valid.”35 Rational choice theorists usually equate utility and wealth, in part for purposes
of simplifying models, and in part to prevent the theory from collapsing into tautology (i.e. “individuals do
what they want”).36 By contrast, behavioral economic theory maintains that rational choice theory does
not accurately reﬂect human behavior; psychological and sociological research demonstrate that cognitive
34More speciﬁcally, rational choice theory relies on four axioms: Ordering, Continuity, Independence, and Invariance. See
Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics 587, 618 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E.
Roth eds., 1995) (describing the ﬁrst three axioms); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 Am.
Psychologist 341, 343 (1984) (arguing that rational choice theory tacitly relies on the invariance axiom as well). There have
been diﬀerent formulations of these axioms and dispute as to their content. See R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games
and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey 25–31 (1957).
The ordering axiom holds that as between any two objects, an individual will prefer one to the other, or be indiﬀerent to
both: in other words, individuals can always compare diﬀerent items. Continuity holds that at some level of probability, in a
choice between the certainty of gaining one item and the possibility of gaining another, more desired item, an individual will be
willing to gamble. Independence holds that when two objects are substituted into identical lotteries, an individual’s preference
between them does not change. Under invariance, “diﬀerent representations of the same choice problem should yield the same
preference.” Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in Rational Choice: The
Contrast Between Economics and Psychology 67, 69 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987).
35William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and Decision Research: Some Historical Context, in Research on
Judgment and Decision Making 4, 11 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997).
36See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 630, 641 n.31 (1999).
8biases and failures result in systemic nonrational behavior,37 even among highly educated individuals.38
Importantly for the advertising context, some scholars have demonstrated that economic actors can and do
exploit these systemic biases to proﬁt at consumers’ expense.39
A thorough rehashing of the debate between these two approaches would take this discussion too far oﬀ topic,
so it is enough to say that this Article generally adopts the behavioral approach. A survey of the literature
reveals that rational choice theory cannot explain economic reality as described in empirical studies as well
as the behavioral approach can.40 This disparity becomes broader the less one deals with purely intercorpo-
rate transactions, and the more one moves into consumer transactions, particularly those where a consumer
could not acquire “perfect information” without gaining scientiﬁc expertise far beyond the ken of what most
individuals possess. Furthermore, as will become apparent, there is substantial empirical data speciﬁcally in
the ﬁeld of prescription drug advertising that suggests the behavioral model is the better one.41
In any case, even rational choice economics acknowledges the possibility of market failures, and that such
failures justify government intervention. While rational choice models often begin by assuming “perfect
information,” a rational choice economist would have to admit that consumers (and probably even doctors)
lack perfect information. The search costs for acquiring such information are high for doctors and insur-
mountable for consumers. Also, there are obvious externalities in this context. In many if not most cases,
37A series of law review articles in the late 1990s established the foundations of behavioral law and economics. See Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev.
1420 (1999); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 36, at 630; Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1997). Daniel Kahneman
and Vernon L. Smith, two of the economists on whose work these authors built, have since won the Nobel Prize in Economics.
Nobel e-Museum, http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002 (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
For a review of the behavioral law and economics literature, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment
and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499 (1998).
38See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 7–8 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (discussing evidence
that many experienced research psychologists erroneously believe in “the law of small numbers”).
39See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 37.
40See supra note 37.
41See generally Part II.C & D.
9neither doctors nor patients face substantial consequences for choosing a more expensive drug over a less
expensive one.42 Rather the cost is socialized through the insurance markets. Although carelessness in
choosing drugs raises health care costs for everyone, it would be diﬃcult for an individual to determine by
how much, and to do a proper cost-beneﬁt analysis. Were the individual able to do such an analysis, he
would still likely ﬁnd that the search costs of becoming fully informed (or ﬁnding a better doctor) would
be higher than the addition to his health insurance premiums. Finally, health care is not a particularly
competitive market.43 Prescription drug patents create monopolies (at least temporarily), a handful of com-
panies controls a large share of the market (and sometimes only one or two companies occupy the market for
treatments of a particular condition).44 The barriers to entry are substantial (the expense of bringing even
one prescription drug to market is quite high). Most rational choice economists would grant that market
failures justify government intervention of some kind.
C.
Impact on Doctors
There are two reasons to examine the impact of advertising and other forms of promotion on doctors. First
of all, it is worth determining whether promotion changes prescribing behavior, and in what ways, in order
to evaluate the public health consequences of non-DTC promotion. Second, such a determination sheds light
on the extent to which doctors, as learned intermediaries, can correct for any undesirable distorting eﬀect
that DTC advertising may have in creating excessive consumer demand for particular prescription drugs.
This latter discussion is particularly relevant, given that advocates of DTC advertising usually assert that
42See Michael S. Wilkes & Miriam Shuchman, Pitching Doctors, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 88, 89.
43See Susan Heilbronner Fisher, Note, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating Pharmaceutical Industry “Freebies,” 1991 Duke
L.J. 206, 207–08, 207 n.7.
44See id.
10doctors can protect patients against any ill eﬀects of such advertising, leaving only the beneﬁts thereof.
Thus, if doctors are generally unable eﬀectively to sort through the mass of information about treatment
options to a particular prescription drug, and patient demand for drugs also inﬂuences prescribing behavior,
DTC advertising may be distorting health care markets in undesirable ways.
There is little question that promotion aﬀects prescribing behavior, although many debate how much it does
and whether it does so in a desirable way. Pharmaceutical manufacturers obviously think that promotion
inﬂuences doctors – one could hardly imagine them spending such extraordinary amounts on marketing
otherwise if they thought otherwise. However, industry apologists suggests that the eﬀect of promotion is
an educative one (bringing the existence and characteristics of new drugs to doctors’ attention) rather than
a distorting one (giving doctors an inﬂated view of new drugs’ merit).
One reason drug advertising has the eﬀect it does is that physicians in fact use such advertising as one of
their primary sources of medical information.45 This reliance has long raised concern amongst physicians,
consumer advocates, and others.46 Numerous studies with varying methodologies have found a strong
correlation between a physician’s relative reliance on prescription drug promotion information and poor
prescribing practices.47
45See Ben Gaffin & Associates, Inc., Attitudes of U.S. Physicians Toward the American Pharmaceutical Industry,
cited in S. Rep. No. 448, 87th Cong., 1st Sees. 154–64 (1961); Marjorie A. Bowman, The Impact of Drug Company Funding
on the Content of Continuing Medical Education, 6 Mobius 66 (1986); Marjorie A. Bowman & David L. Pearle, Changes in
Drug Prescribing Patterns Related to Commercial Company Funding of Continuing Medical Education, 8 J. Continuing Educ.
Health Prof. 13 (1988); Nicole Lurie et al., Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives in Academic Medical Centers: Interaction
with Faculty and House Staﬀ, 5 J. Gen. Internal Med. 240 (1990); W. Paul McKinney et al., Attitudes of Internal Medicine
Faculty and Residents Toward Professional Interaction with Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives, 264 JAMA 1693 (1990);
James P. Orlowski & Leon Wateska, The Eﬀects of Pharmaceutical Firm Enticements on Physician Prescribing Patterns:
There’s No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, 102 Chest 270 (1992).
46See, e.g., Charles D. May, Selling Drugs by “Educating” Physicians, 36 J. Med. Educ. 1, 8–9 (1961) (“The traditional
independence of physicians and the welfare of the public are being threatened by the new vogue among drug manufacturers to
promote their products by assuming an aggressive role in the “education” of doctors).
47See generally, e.g., Joel Lexchin & Barbara Mintzes, Comments to the Food and Drug Administration on Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, Sept. 2002, www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys (last visited Feb. 8, 2003)
(summarizing the literature); Jerry Avorn et al., Scientiﬁc Versus Commercial Sources of Inﬂuence on the Prescribing Behavior
of Physicians, 73 Am. J. Med. 4 (1982); Bowman & Pearle, supra note 45; Joel Lexchin, The Medical Profession and the
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Unhealthy Alliance, 18 Int’l J. Health Services 603 (1988); Orlowski & Wateska, supra note
45; David Siegel & Julio Lopez, Trends in Antihypertensive Drug Use in the United States: Do the JNC V Recommendations
11Some recent examples demonstrate how advertising can lead physicians to falter, sometimes egregiously, in
their role as gatekeepers. The painkiller bromfenac (Duract) and the heart drug mibefradil (Posicor) were
recently withdrawn from the market due to serious safety problems.48 These safety problems were known
before the drug was approved, and many alternatives to each drug existed that were safer than, less expensive
than, and at least as eﬀective as they were.49 However, the drugs were heavily promoted to physicians,
who then wrote 200,000 prescriptions for mibefradil and 2.5 million for bromfenac.50 The FDA actually
cited Hoﬀman-La Roche, Inc., mibefradil’s manufacturer, for a medical journal advertisement that falsely
claimed that mibefradil had an “unparalleled safety proﬁle.”51 It is diﬃcult to explain physicians’ faulty
prescribing behavior here except as a result of manufacturer promotion and of over-reliance by physicians
on advertisements as a source of drug information.
Another incident involved a study by Pollare et al. relating to the eﬀects of hydrochlorothiazide on serum
cholesterol levels and glucose metabolism.52 The results of the study appeared in a front-page story in the
New York Times (“New Study Says Diuretics Raise Heart Attack Risks”), as well as in 200 other newspaper
articles, and enjoyed nationwide television coverage.53 In concert with a public relations ﬁrm, a major
pharmaceutical company organized a press conference and sent audio and video spots to radio and television
stations nationwide.54 Dr. Marvin Moser and his co-authors estimate that thousands of patients called their
Aﬀect Prescribing?, 278 JAMA 1745 (1997). The Avorn et al. study used an ingenious design: it asked doctors about their
beliefs about a drug, in addition to asking where they got information. Avorn et al., supra. Thus, some doctors alleged that they
relied primarily on academic sources of information, but then stated beliefs that almost certainly did not come from reading
the medical literature (e.g. the erroneous belief that cerebral vasodilators eﬀectively treat senile dementia). Id.
48Dep’t Health & Human Services, Food & Drug Administration, FDA Talk Paper: Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories An-
nounces the Withdrawal of Duract from the Market, June 22, 1998; Dep’t Health & Human Services, Food & Drug
Administration, FDA Talk Paper: Roche Laboratories Announces Withdrawal of Posicor from the Market, June 8, 1998.
49Larry D. Sasich (Public Citizen Health Research Group), Comments on Proposed Food and Drug Administration Survey
Entitled “FDA: Attitudinal and Behavioral Eﬀects of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs” (Sept. 29, 1998)
(Docket No. 98N-0748) (HRG Publication # 1460), at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm? (last visited Feb. 8,
2003).
50Id.
51Letter to Rudolph W. Lucek, Group Director, Drug Regulatory Aﬀairs, Hoﬀman-La Roche, Inc., from Janet Norden, MSA,
RN, Regulatory Review Oﬃcer, FDA, Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications (Sept. 5, 1997).
52Thomas Pollare et al., A Comparison of the Eﬀects of Hydrocholothiazide and Captopril on Glucose and Lipid Metabolism
in Patients with Hypertension, 321 N. Engl. J. Med. 868 (1989).
53Marvin Moser et al., Who Really Determines Your Patients’ Prescriptions?, 265 JAMA 498, 498 (1991).
54Id.
12doctors after hearing about the Pollare et al. study, and state that based on personal observations, many
physicians have changed their treatment practices in response to both this media coverage and extensive
promotion targeting professionals, which included a national cable television program.55 Dr. Moser and
his colleagues explain that the data in the Pollare et al. study were not new, that the conclusions drawn
therefrom (in particular that use of diuretics increased the risk of heart attacks) were “pure speculation,”
and that “none of the newer agents appear to combine all the favorable characteristics of thiazide diuretics
(including their relatively low cost).”56 Although the New York Times later ran a follow-up article and a
letter to the editor that placed the study’s ﬁndings in perspective, these neither ran on the front page nor
garnered much attention.57 In fact, new prescriptions for all oral diuretic agents declined by 13 % in four
months, going from 2,155,000 in September 1989 (the date of the Pollare et al. study’s release) to 1,874,000 in
January 1990.58 This dramatic change in prescribing behavior seems primarily attributable to the publicity,
and demonstrates two things. First of all, the many doctors who stopped prescribing oral diuretic agents
must not have been familiar with the existing data that Pollare et al. more or less just replicated. If the
study was enough to make them stop prescribing oral diuretic agents, and they were familiar with existing
data, then they never would have prescribed oral diuretic agents. Second, the doctors who changed their
prescribing behavior were evidently unable or unwilling to weigh the new study against existing literature
in order properly to weigh the beneﬁts and risks of oral diuretic agents. Moser et al. demonstrate that such
consideration would have led them to continue prescribing oral diuretic agents.
Nabumetone (Relafen), a nonsteroidal anti-inﬂammatory drug (NSAID) approved by FDA for treatment of
rheumatoid arthritis and osteoarthritis in 1992, provides a similar example. The manufacturer claimed that
nabumetone was as eﬀective as other NSAIDs and caused relatively few ulcers.59 The FDA-approved package
55Id. at 499.
56Id. at 499–500.
57Id.at 499.
58Id.
59Nabumetone – A New NSAID, 34 The Medical Letter on Drugs and Therapeutics 37 (1992).
13insert stated that nabumetone was “comparable to naproxen [Naprosyn].”60 The worst side eﬀect from
NSAIDs is hemorrhage or perforation of the gastrointestinal tract, and as became clear by 1994, ibuprofen
(Motrin and many generics) created the least risk of this eﬀect, naproxen created an intermediate risk,
and the relative risk for nabumetone remained unknown.61 Despite the lack of any eﬀectiveness advantage
over competitors, the uncertainty as to toxicity risk, and the fact that its wholesale cost was over seven
times as much as naproxen and over 6.5 times as much as ibuprofen, nabumetone sold exceptionally well.62
SmithKline Beecham sales of the drug grew substantially during the second quarter of 1994, increasing by
52 %, thanks to a DTC advertising campaign.63 Nabumetone was the 48th most-prescribed drug in 1994,
and moved up to 44th in 1995,64 when SmithKline Beecham spent $11 million on DTC advertising for the
drug.65 There is no apparent reason why SmithKline Beecham should have been able to sell any nabumetone
at all: it was at best equivalent to dramatically cheaper alternatives, and possibly more dangerous. Again,
doctors failed in their gatekeeping role.
Given how heavily doctors apparently rely on pharmaceutical advertising and promotion, the unbalanced
and often misleading nature of medical journal advertisements potentially leads doctors astray on many
occasions. One study has suggested that as many as 92 % of all medical journal advertisements may violate
FDA guidelines.66 28 % of the ads surveyed were considered unsuitable for publication, 34 % needed
major revisions, and only 82 % of the references cited in the advertisements could actually be veriﬁed.67
Ads lacked information on safety (56 %), eﬃcacy (72 %), appropriate populations (53 %), side eﬀects and
60Nabumetone (Relafen) Product Information, in Physicians’ Desk Reference (1996).
61See D.N. Bateman, NSAIDs: Time To Re-evaluate Gut Toxicity, 343 Lancet 1051 (1994).
62See Larry D. Sasich & Sidney M. Wolfe (Public Citizen Health Research Group), Health Research Group Comments on
Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Promotion, submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (Aug. 12, 1996) (Docket
No. 95N-0227) (HRG Publication #1400).
63Id.
64The Top 200 Drugs 1995, Am. Druggist, Feb. 1996, at 18.
65Sasich & Wolfe, supra note 62.
66Michael S. Wilkes et al., Pharmaceutical Advertisements in Leading Medical Journals: Experts’ Assessments, 116 Annals
Internal Med. 912, 916 (1992). Many have cited the Wilkes et al. study with approval. See, e.g., David A. Kessler,
Addressing the Problem of Misleading Advertising , 116 Annals Internal Med. 950 (1992) (“As the study by Wilkes and
coworkers indicates, the problem of misleading drug advertisements is real.”).
67See Wilkes et al., supra note 66.
14contraindications (50 %), and references (63 %).68 Advertisements also contained misleading references (10
%), textual statements (24 %), and graphs and tables (10 %).69 Even though some of the criticism of
the study is well-placed (though much of it is not),70 it is hard to avoid concluding that some substantial
percentage of medical journal prescription drug advertisements either fail to provide a balanced presentation
or in fact mislead readers. There is certainly no reason to believe that presentations by detailers would prove
any more accurate than journal advertisements.71
Other studies reached similar results. Herxheimer et al. reported that half of the 6700 advertisements
68Id.
69Id.
70There are three primary critiques in the legal literature. See Howard Beales, III & William C. MacLeod, Assessments
of Pharmaceutical Advertisements: A Critical Analysis of the Criticism, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 415 (1995); Jacob Jacoby,
Misleading Research on the Subject of Misleading Advertising: The Wilkes et al. Investigation of Pharmaceutical Advertising
in Leading Medical Journals, 49 Food & Drug L.J. 21 (1994); Paul H. Rubin, Are Pharmaceutical Ads Deceptive?, 49 Food
& Drug L.J. 7 (1994).
Two related complaints were that the study purported to have experts determine which ads were misleading, yet the com-
municative impact of an ad could only reliably be determined via an economic study of the target audience, and that the study
failed to simulate real-world conditions. See Jacoby, supra, at 22–23. Real-life conditions would be impossible to simulate,
however, and the use of actual doctors would have limited utility. If doctors were brought in to read ads, they would do so
more closely than usual, even if they were not told the purpose of the study. They would have to write up their subjective
understanding of the advertisement’s message, and then experts would have to compare that with the scientiﬁc literature. That
might constitute a more perfect study, but it seems that a medical expert can make a reasonable evaluation as to whether an
ad would likely mislead a colleague.
Similarly it was noted that the experts lacked the legal knowledge to reliably determine whether the ads violated FDA stan-
dards. Rubin, supra, at 10–11. They were given no deﬁnition of the term “educational value,” nor did they have the expertise
to determine whether the ad would tend to lead a doctor to misprescribe treatments. Id. at 11–13. The study was faulted
both for using experts, who were not representative readers, and for assigning only two or three readers per ad. Jacoby, supra,
at 25–26. These critics do not explain how their concerns could be addressed without having at least four experts, four federal
regulators, four doctors, and four experts look at every ad, a study design that would increase expenses by a multiple of at least
ﬁve.
Possible distortions in the Wilkes et al. study’s results came from a yea-saying bias (subjects are more apt to say yes to a
question), scaling bias (no mixing up of associations between numbers and levels of agreement with statements), forced-choice
format (no option for “no opinion” – respondents had to agree or disagree), lack of controls, lack of double blind admission,
relinquishment of interviewer control, and alleged ambiguity in the wording of questions. Id. at 27–28. It was also suggested
that the standard for measuring the quality of the ads, juxtaposing them with “all obtainable references,” created too high a
standard. Id. at 30. These are all valid criticisms, but far from fatal.
Data analysis and reporting were also criticized. See Jacoby, supra, at 33–34. It was also pointed out that the study’s results
failed to account for “noise” diﬀerences in perception would lead some portion of even an ideal sample of advertisements to be
misperceived. Id. at 30. However, a reader of the study can correct for those problems, and will see that the study’s essential
ﬁnding of low advertisement quality remains safely intact.
The study was criticized for asking experts to focus on the ad as a whole, Jacoby, supra, at 32, but the whole impression seems
to be a more valid and important question than whether an individual claim is factually accurate. After all, it is the physician’s
overall impression that will inﬂuence whether she will prescribe a particular drug. Finally, one article emphasizes the accuracy
of most of the ads’ statements in isolation. See Beales & McLeod, supra, at 416. The FDA and a good many reasonable
people besides believe that an ad with incomplete information can mislead and, more importantly, can encourage a physician
to prescribe in a way that a fully informed physician would not.
71See supra note 13.
15surveyed in leading journals in eighteen countries lacked important warnings and precautions.72 When Wade
et al. asked pharmaceutical companies to provide their best evidence to support marketing claims, they found
that out of 67 references cited, only 31 contained original data and only thirteen were controlled trials.73
Stryer and Bero determined that advertisements contained more promotional material than educational
material, and rarely contained information about important therapeutic breakthroughs.74
Although doctors can look to the medical literature in order to evaluate these advertisements’ claims, they
face two hurdles. The ﬁrst is that doctors lack suﬃcient time to do the painstaking review necessary
to determine the best course of treatment. The second is that even the apparently objective sources of
scientiﬁc information are increasingly inﬂuenced by the pharmaceutical industry. There is considerable
evidence that companies place pressure on journals to publish favorable studies, reject unfavorable studies,
and edit out dissenting views by researchers involved in favorable studies.75 Scientiﬁc information appearing
72See Andrew Herxheimer et al., Advertisements for Medicines in Leading Medical Journals in 18 Countries, 23 Int’l J.
Health Services 161 (1993).
73Victoria Wade et al., Drug Companies’ Evidence To Justify Advertising, 2 Lancet 1261 (1989).
74Daniel Stryer & Lisa A. Bero, Characteristics of Materials Distributed by Drug Companies: An Evaluation of Appropri-
ateness, 11 J. Gen. Internal Med. 575 (1996).
75See Richard A. Deyo et al., The Messenger Under Attack – Intimidation of Researchers by Special-Interest Groups, 336
New Engl. J. Med. 1176, 1179 (1997) (urging that journals may “need to set up defenses against potential threats of
withholding advertising”); id. at 1177 (“While the manuscript describing the study [which found that calcium channel blockers
caused heart attacks] was under editorial review, pharmaceutical manufacturers tried to discover the identity of the journal to
which it had been submitted, and it appeared to the investigators that opponents were trying to interfere with the publication
of the study”); Robert H. Fletcher & Suzanne W. Fletcher, Pharmaceutical Advertisements in Medical Journals, 116 Annals
Internal Med. 951, 952 (1992); Int’l Comm. of Med. Journal Editors, Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted
to Biomedical Journals, 277 JAMA 927, 934 (1997) (“[A]dvertising must not be allowed to inﬂuence editorial decisions.”);
Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Editors and Advertisements: What Responsibility Do Editors Have for the Advertisements in
Their Journals?, 265 JAMA 2394, 2395–96 (1991) (same); see also David Orentlicher & Michael K. Hehir, II, Advertising
Policies of Medical Journals: Conﬂicts of Interest for Journal Editors and Professional Societies, 27 J.L. Med. & Ethics
113, 113–16, 118 (1999); Arthur S. Relman, Editorial, New “Information for Authors” – and Readers, 323 New Engl. J.
Med. 56, 56 (1990) (explaining journal policy against publishing review articles or editorials about a product if any author
has a ﬁnancial relationship with an interested manufacturer); Lawrence K. Altman, The Doctor’s World: Hidden Discord Over
Right Therapy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1991, at C3 (describing a journal’s initial refusals to publish dissenting views of one
researcher in a study suggesting that an antibiotic eﬀectively treats ear infections, and noting that “scientiﬁc journals proﬁt
handsomely from drug company advertisements, and the inﬂuence of industry on such publications has rarely been studied”);
Vanessa O’Connell, Medical Journals Chase Drug-Ad Dollars, Wall St. J., May 22, 2001, at B8.
16in symposia76 and in journal supplements77 is generally suspect, or at least of lower quality than studies
published in medical journals. There appears to be a publication bias as well: funding for studies often
ceases if a company considers the results unfavorable, so it is more diﬃcult for unfavorable studies to reach
completion and make it into print.78 Finally, an increasing number of articles published in leading journals
(as many as 11 %) are in fact ghost written.79
Even if it were easier for physicians to negotiate this morass of scientiﬁc and quasi-scientiﬁc information,
they would still face substantial pressures from patients who had seen DTC advertising, and it does seem
76See Lisa A. Bero et al., The Publication of Sponsored Symposiums in Medical Journals, 327 New Engl. J. Med. 1135,
1137 (1992) (“Financial pressures on journals appear to contribute to the increasing publication of symposiums.”). Bero et
al. warned that “[s]ymposiums may be given more credence than they deserve, because they often resemble regular journal
issues and may be presented as educational materials. ...The acceptance of symposium publications could distort the medical
literature and ultimately alter physicians’ prescribing practices and patient care.” Id. at 1138. See also Mildred K. Cho & Lisa
A. Bero, The Quality of Drug Studies Published in Symposium Proceedings, 124 Annals Internal Med. 485, 488 (1996).
77See Paula A. Rochon et al., Evaluating the Quality of Articles Published in Journal Supplements Compared with the Quality
of Those Published in the Parent Journal, 272 JAMA 108, 111–12 (1994) (ﬁnding that the lack of regular peer review led to
supplements containing studies of inferior quality).
78See David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Sciences: Evidence from a National Survey of
Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224, 1226 (1997) (describing how some researchers delay publication of their studies “to slow dissemination
of undesired results”); Editorial, The Tightening Grip of Big Pharma, 357 Lancet 1141, 1141 (2001) (condemning the “[e]ﬀort
by drug companies to suppress, spin, and obfuscate ﬁndings that do not suit their commercial purposes”); Drummond Rennie,
Editorial, Thyroid Storm, 277 JAMA 1238 (1997) (describing how industry increasingly sponsors research and seeks to control
its publication); Lawrence K. Altman, Drug Firm, Relenting, Allows Unﬂattering Study to Appear, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16,
1997, at A1 (describing how the manufacturer of the brand-name version of a thyroid drug seriously delayed publication of
a study it had sponsored that determined its drug was no better than cheaper generic versions); David Brown, Scientists
Report Bid to Block Publication of an AIDS Study, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 2000, at A10 (describing a biotechnology company’s
interference with the publication of an unfavorable study, sponsored by the company, of its experimental AIDS vaccine); Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, Gifts to Science Researchers Have Strings Attached, Study Finds, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1998, at A13 (describing
a survey published in JAMA which found that “more than half of the university scientists who received gifts from drug or
biotechnology companies admitted that the donors expected to exert inﬂuence over their work, including review of academic
papers before publication”).
Some journals have recognized the problem. See Frank Davidoﬀ et al., Sponsorship, Authorship, and Accountability, 286
JAMA 1232, 1233 (2001) (“We will not review or publish articles based on studies that are conducted under conditions that
allow the sponsor to have sole control of the data or to withhold publication.”).
Pharmaceutical companies are not the only ones who try to exert inﬂuence over studies they sponsor. The NIH tried to condition
research grants to develop an artiﬁcial heart on control over publication, but a court held that the contract provision violated
the First Amendment. See Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472 (D.D.C. 1991).
79See Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 New Engl. J.
Med. 1539, 1541–43 (2000); Annette Flanagin et al., Prevalence of Articles with Honorary Authors and Ghost Authors in Peer-
Reviewed Medical Journals, 280 JAMA 222, 223–24 (1998) (ﬁnding that eleven percent of sampled articles had ghost authors);
Doug Levy, Ghostwriters a Hidden Resource for Drug Makers, USA Today, Sept. 25, 1996, at 1A; Troyen A. Brennan, Letter,
Buying Editorials, 331 New Engl. J. Med. 673 (1994) (describing one company’s oﬀer of an honorarium to a researcher if he
would sign his name to an editorial endorsing one of the company’s drugs).
17that at least sometimes doctors given in to unwise patient requests. For example, in the hydrochlorothiazide
episode, it is unclear to what extent doctors were responding to the media hype and to what extent to patient
demands (encouraged by that hype), but in either case doctors who changed their prescribing behavior failed
to act as eﬀective gatekeepers. Available evidence suggests that this episode and the others described above
were far from anomalous. It is well-documented that prescribing practices vary in ways not explainable by
diﬀering patient needs.80 One study identiﬁed physicians who prescribed three drugs “at a rate far greater
than that warranted by scientiﬁc evidence of their eﬀectiveness.”81 Patient demand was the most common
reason the physicians gave for prescribing the drugs.82 Another study showed that a patient’s expectation is a
main factor in determining whether a doctor will prescribe an antibiotic.83 Two studies have reaﬃrmed that
patients who expect a prescription are “many times more likely to receive one.”84 An FDA-commissioned
study found that 13 % of the participants said they would be upset with their physicians if they denied
a request for a prescription of an advertised drug.85 Given the relative ease of switching doctors, one can
imagine the impact the threat of losing 13 % of one’s practice would have. In one demonstration that DTC
advertising correlates with inappropriate prescribing practices, a study found that 23.5 % of Americans
over 65, a population that DTC advertising targets heavily, receive at least one of twenty inappropriate
drugs.86 All of this suggests that physicians do not serve as a suﬃcient check on the dangers of DTC
prescription drug promotion. Unfortunately, managed care organizations do not appear to be reducing faulty
prescribing practices.87 In summary, the evidence suggests that promotion to medical professionals leads
80See Marjorie C. Weiss et al., Pressures on the General Practitioner and Decisions To Prescribe, 13 J. Family Pract. 432
(1996); Elina Hemminki, Review of Literature on the Factors Aﬀecting Drug Prescribing, 9 Soc. Sci. Med. 111 (1975).
81Rebecca K. Schwartz et al., Physician Motivations for Nonscientiﬁc Drug Prescribing, 28 Soc. Sci. Med. 577 (1989).
82Id.
83Robert M. Hamm et al., Antibiotics and Respiratory Infections: Are Patients More Satisﬁed When Expectations Are Met?,
43 J. Family Pract. 64 (1996).
84Trisha Greenhalgh, Pressure To Prescribe, 315 BMJ 1482 (1997).
85Louis A. Morris & Lloyd G. Millstein, Drug Advertising to Consumers: Eﬀects of Formats for Magazine and Television
Advertisements, 39 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 497, 502 (1984).
86Sharon M. Wilcox et al., Inappropriate Drug Prescribing for the Community-Dwelling Elderly, 272 JAMA 292 (1994).
87William J. Hueston et al., Evaluation and Treatment of Respiratory Infections: Does Managed Care Make a Diﬀerence?,
44 J. Family Pract. 572 (1997).
18to inappropriate prescribing practices, and that physicians are unable or unwilling to counteract the ill eﬀects
of DTC advertising. This does not mean that current prescribing practices are worse than they would be in
the absence of advertising to professionals and consumers. It does, however, suggest that stronger regulation
is necessary to ensure that such advertising is more accurate and informative. This is particularly so because
consumers themselves are even less able to sort through distortions in prescription drug advertising than
doctors are.
D.
Impact on Consumers
Representatives of the pharmaceutical industry argue that DTC advertising has many health and educational
beneﬁts. A 1998 survey found that over 53 million consumers had discussions with their doctors about a
drug they saw advertised, while another 49 million sought information from another source.88 Viewing of
DTC ads led a projected 21.2 million consumers to discuss a medical condition or illness with their doctors
for the ﬁrst time, and as many as 12.1 million to receive a prescription.89 The study also suggested that
DTC advertising may help improve patient compliance with their drug regimes.90 The mere prompting of
patient-physician dialogue may in fact have signiﬁcant health beneﬁts, as common diseases like diabetes,91
high cholesterol,92 depression,93 and high blood pressure94 often go undiagnosed or untreated. An ad for a
nicotine patch that aired during the 1992 Super Bowl led to a dramatic increase in demand for the patch,
88See Alan F. Holmer, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising Builds Bridges Between Patients and Physicians,
281 JAMA 380, 380 (1999) (citing the study in Prevention Magazine, National Survey of Consumer Reactions to
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (1998)).
89Id.
90Id.
91American Diabetes Association, Clinical Practice Recommendations 1997, 20 Diabetes Care (suppl. 1) S1 (1997).
92Pill Pushers, Economist, Aug. 8, 1997, at 58.
93See Robert M.A. Hirschfeld et al., The National Depressive and Manic-Depressive Association Consensus Statement on
the Undertreatment of Depression, 377 JAMA 333 (1997).
94National Center for Health Statistics, National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (1994).
19and may have helped many individuals stop smoking.95 Patient visits to doctors for osteoporosis increased
by roughly 74 % as a result of DTC advertisements for a new treatment.96 Increased use of prescription
drugs, and particularly of cholesterol-lowering,97 anticoagulant,98 and beta-blocker99 drugs, may produce
substantial public health gains, so DTC advocates urge that the increasing sales resulting from DTC adver-
tising in fact correlate with improvements in public health.100
Some also argue that advertising has positive economic eﬀects. In particular, some have suggested that adver-
tising will tend to reduce prices through shifts to lower-priced brands or drugs, reduction in manufacturers’
prices (due to competition), reduced retail prices, and substitution of lower-cost advertising techniques.101
However, even if DTC advertising improves public health and makes health care markets eﬃciency beyond
what would exist without such advertising (both much-disputed propositions),102 that does not mean that
government and stakeholders cannot reduce its risks and costs as well. If DTC advertising gives consumers
false optimism about dangerous drugs, then there is no question that FDA regulation to ensure promotional
accuracy will not only reduce risks and costs, but will likely extend the beneﬁts to which the pharmaceutical
industry points.
The available evidence shows that DTC advertising tends to be no less unbalanced and misleading than
medical journal advertising. Consumer Reports reviewed 28 DTC ads and found that one-third were not
95Holmer, supra note 88, at 381.
96IMS Health, National Disease and Therapeutic Index (1996).
97John R. Downs, Primary Prevention of Acute Coronary Events with Lovastatin in Men and Women with Average Choles-
terol Levels, 279 JAMA 1615 (1998).
98Agency for Health Care Research, The Secondary and Tertiary Prevention of Stroke Patient Outcomes
Research Team 9th Progress Report (1995).
99Stephen S. Gottlieb et al., Eﬀect of Beta-Blockade on Mortality Among High-Risk and Low-Risk Patients After Myocardial
Infarcation, 339 N. Engl. J. Med. 489 (1998).
100See Holmer, supra note 88, at 381.
101See, e.g., Alison Masson & Paul H. Rubin, Matching Prescription Drugs and Consumers: The Beneﬁts of Direct Adver-
tising, 313 N. Engl. J. Med. 513, 514–15 (1986).
102See, e.g., Eric P. Cohen, Direct-to-the-Public Advertisement of Prescription Drugs, 318 N. Engl. J. Med. 373, 375 (1988)
(arguing that promotion may ultimately increase costs, rather than increase competition, that ﬁrms will tend to focus more
on successful marketing and less on innovation, and that increased (and excessive) purchases of prescription drugs will lead to
unnecessarily high insurance premiums and taxes).
20factually accurate, and many of the accurate ads left out important information or put it in ﬁne print.103
Half did not convey important information on side eﬀects in the main promotional text, and only 40 %
honestly discussed eﬃcacy and fairly described risks and beneﬁts in the main promotional text.104 39 % of
the ads were considered “more harmful than helpful” by at least one reviewer.105 The FDA-mandated “brief
summaries” in 61 % of the ads were in medical jargon and small print, and in a separate study, a research
psychologist and reading-comprehension expert rated these summaries as ranging from “extremely diﬃcult”
to “ultra diﬃcult” to read.106 Most drug ads also fail to point out lifestyle and behavior changes that can
be at least as eﬀective as medication.107
Other studies have reached similar results. Bell et al. evaluated 320 advertisements in 18 popular magazines
and found that most of them “provided only a minimal amount of information.”108 In particular, few ads
discussed the relevant condition’s precursors or prevalence, misconceptions about the condition, the drug’s
mechanism of action, success rate, or treatment duration, or behavioral changes or alternative treatments
that could achieve the same ends as the drug.109
A few examples demonstrate more speciﬁcally how DTC advertisements seek to inﬂate consumer perceptions
of prescription drug products. An advertisement for the dangerous diabetes drug troglitazone (Rezulin), pub-
lished in the December 1998 El Tiempo Latino, a publication distributed with newspapers in cities with large
Hispanic populations, presented the drug’s beneﬁts and promotional information in Spanish and its risks
and warnings in English.110 Advertisements for allergy products Seldane, Hismanal, Claritin, and Flonase
103Drug Advertising: Is This Good Medicine?, Cons. Rep., June 1996, at 62.
104Id.
105Id.
106Id. at 62–63.
107Id.
108Robert A. Bell et al., The Educational Value of Consumer-Targeted Prescription Drug Print Advertising, 49 J. Family
Pract. 1092 (2000).
109Id.
110Larry D. Sasich & Sidney M. Wolfe, Letter to Minnie Baylor-Henry, Director, Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and
Communications, Food and Drug Administration (Jan. 6, 1999), at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm? (last
visited Feb. 8, 2003).
21imply that they are 100 % eﬀective (they are not).111 Ads for Rogaine fail to mention that it does not really
work for men over 40.112 The ad for MetroGel mentions the pimples, broken blood vessels, and nose growth
that occur in those suﬀering from rosacea, but relegates to ﬁne print the admission that the drug only treats
the pimples.113 The FDA had to pull ads for the arthritis drug Celebrex that portrayed arthritis suﬀerers
rowing boats and using scooters.114
There is considerable evidence that these advertisements do in fact mislead consumers. An FDA-commissioned
study found that the format of advertisement substantially impacts consumers’ perception of the relative
risks and beneﬁts of drugs.115 In general, disclosure of a higher number of the risks and of speciﬁc rather
than general risks, whether in television or print format, led to a more balanced evaluation of the beneﬁt-risk
ratio, although full disclosure tended to increase the amount of knowledge consumers carried away, whereas
in print ads it decreased the total amount of knowledge.116 It is worth noting that the ads produced for this
study were designed to present drugs as “important medicines,” whereas many ads treat prescription drugs
somewhat more like ordinary consumer products, and that subjects in a study will likely study ads more
carefully than they would in real life.117 Thus, if anything, the potential for consumers to develop distorted
understandings of the beneﬁts of prescription drugs is higher even than the study suggests.
Even if the proﬁt motive did not prevent manufacturers from producing balanced accurate, and informative
advertisements,118 consumers’ lack of expertise would still make it diﬃcult for them to make good decisions
based on the information.119 Given that consumers must often have exaggerated impressions of prescription
111Drug Advertising: Is This Good Medicine?, supra note 103.
112Id.
113Id.
114Chris Adams, FDA Scrambles to Police Drug Ads’ Truthfulness, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 2001, at A24.
115Morris & Millstein, supra note 85, at 502–03.
116Id. at 500–01.
117See id. at 502–03.
118See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Drugs, Prescription Drug Advertising Direct to the Consumer, 88
Pediatrics 174 (1991) (arguing that the proﬁt motive does prevent honest advertising); Lynnette R. Bradley & Julie Magno
Zito, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 35 Med. Care 86, 88 (1997) (noting that consumers lack “necessary
clinical and pharmacologic expertise to accurately evaluate and comprehend prescription drug advertising” and that DTC may
lead to excessive drug consumption); Cohen, supra note 102, at 373–34.
119See generally Cohen, supra note 102,
22drugs’ beneﬁts, the drive that DTC advertising has created for consumers to demand those drugs may at
best be misallocating scarce health care resources and may at worst be creating a serious threat to public
health and safety.
The rise of DTC advertising appears to be leading to several harms, including unnecessary increases in
spending on prescription drugs, improper use thereof, and harm that results even from proper use.120 Dis-
tortions of patients’ preferences place pressures on their physicians to prescribe heavily advertised medicines,
and even the doctors who are willing to resist those pressures and guide patients to more appropriate treat-
ments may themselves be duped by prescription drug promotion. The medical literature itself is increasingly
becoming a mineﬁeld of covert marketing, and time-pressed physicians have great diﬃculty separating the
wheat from the chaﬀ.
Although it would be nice if the pharmaceutical industry and the medical profession worked more to self-
regulate and to raise ethical standards, the absence of any meaningful prospect for such reforms suggests
that the FDA will have to do a much better job of ensuring that information reaching doctors and patients
is in fact reliable.
III. FDA Regulation of Prescription Drug Promotion
With the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962,121 Congress transferred authority to regulate pre-
scription drug advertising targeting health professionals from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to the
120Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs: Creating Consumer Demand, 281 JAMA 382
(1999).
121Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
23FDA.122 Neither the Amendments nor the legislative history make clear whether the FDA would have ju-
risdiction over DTC advertising as well, because the pharmaceutical industry basically did not engage in
it at the time, but the FDA has since assumed such jurisdiction without objection.123 The Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)124 now requires that any advertisement include the drug’s generic name and
formula, and a “brief summary,” which must include information about the drug’s eﬀectiveness and risks.125
The FDA has adopted regulations to implement these requirements. It has deﬁned “advertisement” (which
is not deﬁned in the FDCA) to include manufacturer-sponsored drug promotion information other than
“labeling.”126 Examples of “advertising” include “advertisements in published journals, magazines, other
periodicals, and newspapers, and advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, and
telephone communication systems.”127 FDA regulations have also created two major requirements as to
advertisement content. The ﬁrst is that the “brief summary” must state the drug’s indications for use, side
eﬀects, contraindications, warnings, and precautions.128 Second, under the “fair balance doctrine,” the entire
advertisement must provide a balanced presentation of all clinically relevant information (i.e. the beneﬁts
should not be unduly emphasized and the risks must be presented clearly and prominently).129 In the DTC
context, risk information must appear in the main text of the advertisement, in non-technical language.130
No advertisement can be false or misleading, and the information presented must be consistent with the
122See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3) (2000) (“no advertisement of a prescription drug ...shall, with respect to the matters speciﬁed
in this paragraph ..., be subject to the provisions of section 12 though 17 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”).
123See Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,538 (Sept. 9, 1971) (agreement between the FDA and the FTC that
the FDA will have primary authority over prescription drug advertising); Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 23, at 427.
124Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codiﬁed at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.).
12521 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2002).
126See 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) (deﬁning “labeling” as “any written, printed, or graphic matter upon or accompanying the drug”);
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(1) (2002) (deﬁning “advertising”); id. § 202.1(l)(2) (including under the term “labeling” items such as
“[b]rochures, booklets, mailing pieces, detailing pieces, ﬁle cards, bulletins, calendars, price lists, catalogs, house organs, letters,
motion picture ﬁlms, ﬁlm strips, lantern slides, sound recordings, exhibits, literature, and reprints and similar pieces of printed,
audio, or visual matter descriptive of a drug and references published (for example, the “Physicians [sic] Desk Reference”) for
use by medical practitioners, pharmacists, or nurses, containing drug information supplied by the manufacturer, packer, or
distributor of the drug and which are disseminated by or on behalf of its manufacturer, packer, or distributor”).
12721 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(1).
128See id. § 202.1(e) (2002).
129See id. § 202.1(e)(5)–(7).
13060 Fed. Reg. 42,581, 42,583 (Aug. 16, 1995).
24approved labeling.131
The FDA treats DTC advertising and advertising targeted toward professionals similarly, and it recognizes
three categories of advertising:
(1) “Product-claim,” containing safety and eﬃcacy claims about a particular drug(s); (2)
“help-seeking,” containing information about a disease or condition and a recommendation
for the consumer to consult a health care provider, when appropriate, while excluding dis-
cussions of speciﬁc treatments or drugs; and (3) “reminder,” containing the name of the
drug and other limited information, but excluding all representations or suggestions about
the drug(s).132
The “brief summary” and “fair balance” requirements only apply to “product claim” ads.133
The Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications (DDMAC), within the FDA’s Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), has begun to recognize the need to regulate DTC ads diﬀerently
from those targeting professionals.134 Because consumers have less expertise than doctors and perceive and
process claims and information diﬀerently, the FDA interprets fair balance to require clear, non-technical
language and adequate information about context and risks in DTC advertising.135
The DDMAC requires manufacturers to submit advertisements to it at the time when they ﬁrst run, and
requests that manufacturers submit ads for evaluation prior to release.136 A manufacturer that does get
pre-approval gains a safe harbor; although the FDA can later change its mind, it will give the manufacturer
reasonable notice and opportunity to withdraw the advertisement before taking any regulatory action.137
Pre-clearance is only required if a drug received approval on an expedited basis.138
The DDMAC monitors advertisements to ﬁnd and correct violations, and also relies on complaints by private
citizens, professionals, and companies.139 Violators receive either a Notice of Violation (NOV) Letter (if the
131See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)–(7).
13321 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(2)(i).
134See Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 23, at 429.
135Id.
13621 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(3)(i) (2002).
137Id. § 202.1(j)(4) (2002).
138Id. § 314.550 (2002).
139See Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 23, at 429.
25violation is minor) or a warning letter (threatening to bring legal action if the violation is not corrected); such
letters are posted on the CDER’s website.140 NOV letters request discontinuation of the violative behavior,
generally to commence within two weeks.141
DDMAC took 140 enforcement actions in 1997, 157 in 1998, 108 in 1999, 69 in 2000, 72 in 2001, 28 in
2002, and only 4 for the ﬁrst two months of 2003.142 Given that television advertisements, which tend
to be more manipulative than print advertisements, have become more prominent recently, that overall
DTC advertising has increased dramatically, and that there is no evidence of a sea change in advertisement
quality, this dwindling enforcement activity demonstrates a substantial abdication of the FDA’s enforcement
responsibilities.
The FDA issued a ﬁnal “Guidance for Industry, Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements” in 1999,
to deal with the special concerns of broadcast advertising.143 Although the guidance lacks legal force, the
FDA has represented that compliance with it will serve as a safe harbor against legal action.144 It allowed
advertisers to substitute “adequate provision” of approved product labeling for the brief summary.145 Each
advertisement must include a “major statement,” which discloses major risks.146 “Adequate provision”
requires that the advertisement include: a toll-free number, through which consumers can order the drug’s
labeling or have it read over the phone; a website address that provides the package labeling text; reference
to another method of obtaining package labeling, suﬃcient for a person with limited Internet access or
140See id.; http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
141See Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 23, at 429.
142See http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
143FDA, Guidance for Industry, Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, Aug. 1999, available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder.guidance/1804fnl.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003) [hereinafter FDA, Broadcast Advertisements
Guidance]. Hearings on DTC advertising were held in 1995. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, FDA Public Hearing on Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, Silver Spring, MD (Oct. 18–19, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 FDA
Hearings].
144See Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 23, at 430.
145See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2002); FDA, Broadcast Advertisements Guidance, supra note 143.
146See FDA, Broadcast Advertisements Guidance, supra note 143; 1995 FDA Hearings, supra note 143.
26who is uncomfortable directly requesting the information; and a statement that pharmacists or health care
providers may provide more information.147
The FDA’s regulatory approach continues to evolve. However, as the FDA seeks to develop ﬂexible responses
to new regulatory challenges, it must contend with constitutional limitations on its regulatory powers.
IV. First Amendment Constraints on FDA Regulation of Advertising
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has given increasing First Amendment protection to commercial speech.
The distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech arose in Valentine v. Christensen,148 with
the former falling outside the First Amendment.149 35 years later, in 1976, Virginia Pharmacy Board
commenced the commercial speech revolution.150
There are three tests for identifying “commercial speech.”151 The Court has “usually deﬁned [it] as speech
that does no more than propose a commercial transaction.”152 When advertisements discuss social issues,
the Court looks to whether a combination of three elements – advertising format, reference to a speciﬁc
product, and economic motivation for speech – exists.153 Commercial speech is also “expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”154
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission155 laid out the current test for whether a regulation of
147See FDA, Broadcast Advertisements Guidance, supra note 143.
148316 U.S. 52 (1942).
149See id. at 54 (“[T]he Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.”).
150The revolution arguably began a year earlier, in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975), which held that Virginia
could not criminalize abortion advertisements, but that case also involved the constitutional right to abortion.
151See generally Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422–23 (1993).
152United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001). See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001);
Edenﬁeld v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
153Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).
154Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
155447 U.S. 557 (1980).
27commercial speech passes constitutional muster. To qualify for protection the speech “at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading.”156 If the speech meets that standard, the regulation must “directly
advance” a “substantial” governmental interest, and “not [be] more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.”157 “No more extensive than is necessary” is diﬀerent from and less exacting than “least restrictive
alternative.”158
Commercial speech doctrine is grounded in four primary interests: “the consumer’s interest in the free ﬂow
of information” (which “may be ...keener ...than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate”);
society’s “strong interest in the free ﬂow of commercial information;” the “public interest” in having the
“private economic decisions” that allocate resources “be intelligent and well informed;” and “the formation
of intelligent opinions as to how [the economic system] ought to be regulated or altered.”159 The doctrine
thus looks disfavorably upon asserted governmental interests that “rest[] in large measure on the advantages
of [keeping citizens] in ignorance,” and on regulations that take a “highly paternalistic approach.”160 By
contrast, the doctrine does permit reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and the government may
seek to ensure “that the stream of commercial information ﬂows cleanly as well as freely.”161 It is also worth
noting that unlike most free speech doctrine, the primary emphasis is on the listener’s autonomy, not the
speaker’s.162
Because commercial speech is more “objective” and “hardy” than other forms of speech, not only do regula-
tions restricting it receive less scrutiny than restrictions on, say, political speech, but commercial speech also
lacks other kinds of First Amendment Protection.163 For example, commercial speech’s special characteris-
156Id. at 566.
157Id.
158See Bd. of Trustees, State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
159Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763–65 (1976).
160Id. at 769–70.
161Id. at 772.
162See id. at 763–65
163Id. at 771 n.24.
28tics “may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker.”164 “They
may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such
additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.”165 They
also make commercial speech less eligible (if at all) for the traditional prohibitions against prior restraints166
and overbroad statutes.167
Two principles are particularly relevant to the drug promotion context: First, a vendor may not transform
commercial speech into more protected speech by unnecessarily mixing the two. As Justice Scalia said in
his opinion for the Court in Board of Trustees, State University of New York v. Fox,168 “No law of man or
of nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without teaching home economics.”169 Second, there is no
“vice” exception to commercial speech doctrine, so there is little doubt that commercial speech extends to
similarly dangerous or (in some ways) undesirable prescription drugs.170
V. Design and Justiﬁcations for a Pre-approval Regime
The current regime under which the FDA regulates prescription drug advertising is inadequate for several
reasons.
164Id.
165Id.
166Id.
167See Bates v. State Bar of Georgia, 433 U.S. 350, 380–81 (1977) (“[T]he justiﬁcation for the application of overbreadth
analysis applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context”).
168492 U.S. 469 (1989).
169Id. at 474.
170See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484
(1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). The “vice” exception did have a brief heyday. See United States v.
Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (lotteries); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328 (1986) (gambling).
29First, even if the FDA were willing and able to take regulatory action against every unlawful prescription
drug advertisement, it would be nearly impossible to correct the damage caused by an advertisement’s orig-
inal publication or broadcast, particularly in the DTC context. If the advertisement merely ceases to run,
there will still be patients and physicians with inaccurate perceptions of the drug. Even if the FDA requires
the company to publish or broadcast a retraction of claims that it made, there is no guarantee that the indi-
viduals misled by the original advertisement will see the retraction. There is no guarantee that individuals
misled by a print advertisement read the publication regularly. It seems unlikely that even a doctor who
did read the relevant publication regularly would exhaustively read through every advertisement. Certainly
consumers do not read through every advertisement in newspapers or magazines. With broadcast media,
there is even less likelihood that a person who sees or hears a misleading advertisement will be watching
or listening when the retraction comes on. Given the poor information quality of most prescription drug
advertisements, and the likelihood that a great many of them violate FDA regulations, this inability to
correct for the ill eﬀects of misinformation is a serious problem. Obviously the longer the FDA takes to
discover violations, the more damage those violations do.
Of course, the FDA does not in fact have the resources to catch all or even most of the unlawful adver-
tisements, nor can it catch the ones it does ﬁnd quickly. In recent years the DDMAC has not taken action
against more than 157 advertisements in a year, yet this is only a fraction of the advertisements produced
in a year, and a projection from any of the studies examining such advertisements for honesty, fairness, and
accuracy would suggest that there are substantially more than 157 violations in a year. Even those violations
that are discovered last a long time before being “corrected.” A manufacturer does not need to give the
FDA a copy of an advertisement until the ad begins to run. Even if the FDA began review the instant it
received the advertisement (an unlikely state of aﬀairs), such review obviously takes at least some time, and
companies who receive regulatory letters are generally given 10 days to notify FDA how they plan to comply.
30Therefore, in the best of cases, unlawful ads would likely run for at least three weeks before being removed.
In reality, review likely neither begins immediately nor moves quickly, given the small number of FDA staﬀ
assigned to the task (apparently about 24 as of 2002).171
Even if the FDA did have the resources to perform its regulatory role, it has apparently become increasingly
lax in its enforcement of advertising regulations. The number of enforcement letters sent out per year has
decreased from 157 in 1998 (already inadequate) to 28 in 2002. Wilkes et al. found more violations than that
just within a sample of 109 advertisements, a tiny fraction of the number that come out every year.172 The
FDA’s abdication of its responsibilities in this department appears to be nothing short of astonishing. This
failure adequately to regulate the content of prescription drug advertising is all the more troubling, given
the high conﬁdence the public has in the agency and the likely assumption that ads could not run without
passing careful FDA scrutiny.
Thus, the FDA could not under the best of circumstances prevent substantial harm to the public interest
from unlawful advertising, and its lack of resources and will to carry out its enforcement mandate make the
situation far worse.
Requiring pre-approval for all prescription drug advertising could solve many of the problems under the cur-
rent regime. Perhaps most importantly, it would prevent unlawful ads from reaching physicians and patients
in the ﬁrst place, and thus also prevent the confusion that must inevitably result under the existing system.
It would also eliminate the costs of running retractions (although drug companies obviously consider the
beneﬁts from unlawful advertisement worth the risk of such costs).
Pre-approval would also create optimal incentives for both the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA. The
industry would have strong motivation to produce appropriately balanced and accurate advertisements, since
the chance of successfully getting an unlawful advertisement into print or on the air would go from high to
171See Thomas Abrams, DDMAC Enforcement and Policy Update (Oct. 22, 2002),
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/Presentations/tomfdli902/index.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002).
172See Wilkes et al., supra note 66.
31extremely low. The costs of submitting an unlawful ad to the FDA would be substantial: the company doing
so would not only have to pay to produce a new ad, it would lose valuable promotion time in a regime where
its patent only lasts for so long, and it would have to go through another pre-approval waiting period. The
substantial reduction in likelihood of successfully getting an unlawful ad past the FDA would also eliminate
the race to the bottom that currently exists. Manufacturers who might otherwise prefer to produce balanced
ads must nevertheless push the envelope as far as they can (or burst it) in order to compete with their
competitors claims. A pre-approval regime would level the playing ﬁeld and end this market failure. At the
same time, the FDA would also have optimal incentives. The agency would be more obviously responsible
for any public health crises or other ill eﬀects arising from misleading advertisements. Of course, the FDA
is accountable under the current regime, but with pre-approval it would be guaranteed that the FDA aﬃr-
matively authorized the running of the ad, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence from a mere failure to take action against
an ad.
Although pre-approval would require more resources than the FDA currently has for regulating prescription
drug advertisements, it seems likely that the costs of adding staﬀ would be small compared to the potential
public health costs resulting from the failures of the current regime. It may also be that under pre-approval
each ad would need less scrutiny than currently, because companies would generally produce more informa-
tive and balanced advertisements.
To the extent that prescription drug advertising is a desirable thing, there is no reason to believe that pre-
approval will diminish such advertising or injure public health. No one disputes that advertising leads to
substantially higher prescription drug revenues. If, as the pharmaceutical industry maintains, advertisements
are currently lawful and informative, then under a pre-approval regime the ads will still be that way (and
still create the same substantial marketing returns), and it is diﬃcult to believe that the added delay costs of
pre-approval would be enough to erase the enormous marketing beneﬁts of advertising. If, as is actually the
32case, prescription drug advertisements often fail to comply with FDA regulations, then pre-approval could
only improve the information that consumers and physicians receive. If that led to a decrease in prescription
drug sales, than that would just mean that there had been an excess of inappropriate prescriptions under the
old system. In this latter instance, the old system would have involved a misallocation of societal resources
as between development of truly innovative and useful drugs and marketing of less exceptional drugs.
Of course, the FDA would have to design its pre-approval system to minimize delay of advertisements in
reaching the public. One way to do this would be to begin reviewing advertisements for a drug before it has
been approved for use. There is no reason to believe that it would be diﬃcult for companies to determine
before a drug is approved what its primary risks are. Most of the content of the ad can be developed without
knowing the speciﬁc results of the last round of clinical trials, and it would be easy enough to develop formats
that could accommodate any gaps in information. For example a company preparing a print advertisement
could show the FDA where it intends to place information about a drug’s eﬃcacy, so that the FDA could
approve the rest of the ad provisionally, and then simply look at how the company presents the last piece
of information when it becomes available. Similarly, the company could ﬁlm the content of a broadcast
advertisement and leave a gap in the voice-over for missing information.
There would be instances where a company was unsure whether a drug it had developed would gain FDA
approval, and would therefore be unwilling to develop advertisements until it had gained approval. However,
in such cases the uncertainty would likely result either from questions about eﬃcacy or concerns about dan-
gerous side eﬀects. In either case, slowing the diﬀusion of the drug into the economy would often be more
beneﬁcial than harmful.
An optimal program would have the following features: It would permit review of advertisements before
approval of a drug, and hopefully limit delays in approval for an advertisement to less than one month
after a drug’s approval for use. To the extent a drug company could not reasonably be expected to develop
33advertisements before a drug’s approval for use, there should be some provision for expedited review. The
FDA should also develop some model advertisement formats that generally tend to meet fair balance and
brief summary requirements. As ﬁrms began to follow the formats, the speed of review would increase, and a
certain amount of standardization might make it easier for consumers and doctors to evaluate and compare
advertised prescription drugs.
Whether the FDA shifts to pre-approval or not, it should require that prescription drug advertisements
contain more information about eﬃcacy, cost, and alternative forms of treatment. If a prescription drug
truly is a superior product, it costs its manufacturer little to provide accurate information in these areas. If
the drug is an inferior product, then it will either be easier for patients and doctors to determine as much, or
the company will devote fewer or no resources to promoting it. Either course will lead to less prescribing of
an inappropriate drug. Broadcast advertisements present special problems, and congressional action is likely
necessary to strengthen requirements for such advertisements and to increase penalties for noncompliance.
VI. Pre-approval Does Not Violate the First Amendment
Although the pharmaceutical industry (and perhaps some civil libertarians) might argue that pre-approval
violates the First Amendment, that is not in fact the case.
It should be remembered at the outset that the only beneﬁciaries of commercial speech protection are honest
advertisers; false and misleading advertisements get no protection. Also recall that the rights of the speaker
are only recognized insofar as they advance the right of the hearer to a free ﬂow of information.173
173See generally Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
34The only diﬀerence between pre-approval and the current regime, which is obviously constitutional, is the
prior restraint element. The case law is quite explicit that regulation of advertisements for truthfulness
and disclosure of important information is not only permissible, but in fact a desirable way of furthering
the purpose of commercial speech protection: to promote dissemination of accurate economic information.
Virginia Pharmacy Board also speciﬁcally states that the presumption against prior restraints does not
necessarily apply to commercial speech.174
There can be little doubt that regulation of prescription drug advertising serves substantial governmental
interests. Pre-approval, like the current regime, seeks not to suppress truthful speech, but rather to ensure
that advertising only provides truthful and balanced information. There is nothing “paternalistic” about
ensuring “that the stream of commercial information ﬂows cleanly as well as freely.”175 This is to be distin-
guished from FDA advertising that actually suppresses speech.176 Commercial speech’s “objectivity” and
“hardiness” “may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form,
or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being de-
ceptive.”177 Truthful advertising, the only kind protected by commercial speech doctrine, would have no
diﬃculty gaining pre-approval, so pre-approval has no more tendency to suppress protected speech than does
the current regime.
One might argue that a pre-approval requirement could impede the ﬂow of truthful commercial information
by somehow chilling production of even truthful speech, but that result seems unlikely. As Virginia Pharmacy
Board noted, “[s]ince advertising is the Sine qua non of commercial proﬁts, there is little likelihood of its
174Id. at 771 n.24.
175Id. at 772.
176It was suppression of speech that the Supreme Court invalidated in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S.
357, 360 (2002)
177Id. at 771 n.24.
35being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.”178 As was suggested above, truthful advertisers are
already gaining substantial sales revenues from their advertising. Why would they suddenly stop advertising
if they had to wait an extra two or three weeks to start running the advertisements? In fact, pre-approval
would give truthful advertisers greater incentives to promote their products. Under the current system,
unlawful advertisements are unlikely to be withdrawn, and even withdrawn ads will likely run for weeks
before they stop, and the oﬀending manufacturer will still reap gains from misinformation. Pre-approval
would level the playing ﬁeld – unlawful advertisers could no longer reach the print and broadcast media, so
a product advertised truthfully would appear more attractive to consumers than it would have under the
old system.
It is also clear that pre-approval would “directly advance” the government’s substantial interest in promot-
ing a steady ﬂow of truthful information about prescription drugs. What more eﬀective way could there be
to prevent consumer misinformation than to prevent deceptive ads from running at all? It is likely that a
recognition that misinformation can harm consumers, even if it is later withdrawn, combined with an under-
standing that delay alone will not likely deter companies from advertising, explain the Virginia Pharmacy
Board Court’s willingness to extend less protection against prior restraints to commercial speech than to
other forms of speech. Pre-approval not only stems the tide of misinformation, but it may in fact encourage
more truthful lawful advertisements. As suggested above, companies unwilling to create unlawful advertise-
ments have more to gain from advertising in the newly leveled playing ﬁeld than under the current regime.
Moreover, advertisers may err on the side of more honesty and balance than is absolutely necessary to gain
approval, because they do not wish to risk the costs of delay and of producing additional advertisements.
While in other contexts this sort of pressure to speak in a particular way would run against the goals of the
First Amendment, here it actually directly advances the First Amendment’s goal: the interest protected by
178Id.
36commercial speech doctrine is not the speaker’s right of self-expression, but rather the right of hearers to
acquire truthful economic information.
The most diﬃcult question in the analysis is whether a pre-approval regime would be “more extensive than
is necessary to serve [the government’s] interest.”179 This inquiry does not require that pre-approval be the
“least restrictive means,” but rather that the regulation be “no more extensive than reasonably necessary
to further substantial interests.”180 As has already been suggested, it is not at all clear that pre-approval
would deter truthful commercial speech more than the current regime does; it may in fact have the opposite
eﬀect. If pre-approval is no less apt to produce a free ﬂow of truthful information than is the current regime,
there is certainly no constitutional diﬃculty.
In the unlikely event that pre-approval did in fact deter truthful speech, the analysis would become more
complicated. A court considering the question would have to look not only to the options available to
the FDA under its statutory authority, but also to other options that Congress could create. Otherwise,
Congress could do an end run around the First Amendment by leaving the FDA with an unnecessarily
speech-restrictive approach as the only means of eﬀectively carrying out its mission. A court would have to
weigh the information costs and beneﬁts of numerous possible alternatives, many of which the government
may never have tried. Given how much diﬃculty legislators and social scientists have resolving questions
regarding the communicative eﬀect of advertising and the likely response of businesses to particular regu-
lations, it is unlikely that a court would fare better. The ultimate resolution may have more to do with
a judge’s “common sense” notions about human behavior than anything else, so the legal result may vary
depending on the judge. Moreover, a court might reach diﬀerent conclusions as to the constitutionality of
pre-approval of DTC advertising as opposed to non-DTC advertising. In any case, the FDA or Congress
would do well to assemble a record containing the best empirical information they can ﬁnd about the likely
179Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
180Bd. of Trustees, State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
37eﬀects of diﬀerent regimes.
While it is impossible to be exhaustive in considering alternatives, and the way a court will rule is somewhat
indeterminate, it is fruitful to consider the merits of speciﬁc alternatives. The ﬁrst alternative would be the
current regime. It is certainly within Congress’s power to make the FDA’s regulatory activity under this
regime more like the “best-case scenario” outlined at the beginning of Part V, where the FDA has the re-
sources to evaluate all prescription drug advertisements quickly, and has the political will to take regulatory
action against all unlawful advertisements. The FDA could also force companies to withdraw unlawful ad-
vertisements more quickly. Thus, the FDA could plausibly make a determination within a few days after an
advertisement begins to run, require that the advertisement be withdrawn “immediately,” and require that
the oﬀending company run an advertisement speciﬁcally correcting any misstatements or supplying with-
held information. In the case of medical journal advertisements, the FDA might also reasonably be able to
require the journal to prominently run a correction to the information in the advertisement, given that such
journals reasonably can be expected to exercise some editorial judgment in accepting ads for publication.
Even under this dream scenario, however, there would be harms that pre-approval could have prevented.
Even if misinformation is only broadcast for a week, there will still be many people who see or hear that
information. There is no guarantee that a correction will reach those people. Some empirical evidence on
how quickly commercial information diﬀuses would be helpful in evaluating the costs of allowing one week
of misinformation. That would then have to be weighed against the costs that pre-approval would create in
terms of deterrence of truthful advertising.
Another alternative would be the creation of a waiting period: if the FDA failed to object to a submitted
advertisement within, say, two weeks of its submission, the manufacturer could run it. The FDA could
retain the authority to take regulatory action at a later time, but this approach would limit the delay that
truthful advertisements would experience before running. At ﬁrst glance, this approach appears to have the
38beneﬁts of pre-approval, without the deterrent eﬀect that an unduly long delay that might occur under a
pre-approval regime. This would especially be the case if the FDA proved unable to evaluate advertisements
expeditiously under a pre-approval regime. However, the waiting period approach would in fact have costs
as compared to pre-approval. First of all, unlawful advertisements might in fact reach the public. The
cases where the FDA would be unable to act in time before the ad’s release would likely be ones in which
the scientiﬁc information is complicated or indeterminate – precisely the cases in which it would be most
diﬃcult for doctors and patients to determine the truth on their own. Second, consumers would assume that
all advertisements out there were truthful, thereby increasing the damage from the unlawful advertisements
that get through. Admittedly, consumers may assume the accuracy of prescription drug ads even under the
current regime, so this too would require some empirical research. Third, pre-approval would create more
powerful incentives for the FDA to do its job. Under the waiting period approach, there would be no way
to tell whether the FDA is scrutinizing advertisements closely or passively. The agency could always plead
a lack of resources if any unlawful advertisements got through. On the other hand, under pre-approval, the
FDA would have to make a deﬁnitive evaluation of the advertisement. If the FDA had to in fact sign oﬀ on
the advertisement’s content, it would necessarily take its job seriously.
Another alternative would be for Congress to create a federal cause of action for any health or economic
injury resulting from an unlawful advertisement. Congress could create a presumption that any consumer
injury resulted from the misinformation in the ad. Congress could even allow liability in cases where the
consumer had not seen an advertisement, because the sources from whom the consumer or her doctor got
information about the drug might have been impacted by promotion. Many states are currently consider-
ing the implications of DTC advertising for the learned intermediary doctrine, and there is no reason why
Congress could not do the same.181 However, this approach might prove both less eﬀective in producing a
181A discussion of the learned intermediary doctrine would be beyond the scope of this Article, and there is already a voluminous
literature on the subject. See, e.g., Jeﬀrey J. Wiseman, Another Factor in the “Decisional Calculus”: The Learned Intermediary
39ﬂow of truthful commercial information and more speech-restrictive than pre-approval. Liability would be
less eﬀective than pre-approval because the latter would catch all unlawful ads, whereas the former would
require a consumer who has the time, resources, and knowledge of his rights necessary to go to court, and
whose injury costs, adjusted for the risk that he might lose his lawsuit, were suﬃcient to justify going to court.
The liability approach would thus be underinclusive, perhaps substantially so. More importantly, liability
might have more of a chilling eﬀect than pre-approval. Pre-approval would only deter truthful speakers who
could not aﬀord the cost of delay. Speakers who only gain a de minimis beneﬁt from advertising would be
unlikely to risk having a jury erroneously ﬁnd their advertisement unlawful, and award a verdict accordingly.
Many advertisers who could aﬀord the delay under pre-approval would also be unwilling to take this risk.
Finally, the government could respond to the threat of misinformation by compiling, publishing, and dis-
tributing information regarding the absolute and comparative merits of all the drugs on the market. Con-
sumers and, more importantly, doctors would know that a deﬁnitive information source existed, and therefore
any harm from unlawful advertisements that make it into the stream of commercial information under the
current regime would be reduced. The ﬁrst answer to the argument that the availability of this approach
makes pre-approval unconstitutional is that it proves too much. Almost all regulation of advertising would
be unconstitutional under that argument, since it is diﬃcult to imagine a ﬁeld where the government could
not assemble comparative information and publish it. Yet Virginia Pharmacy Board speciﬁcally acknowl-
edged that traditional regulation of advertisements’ truthfulness and completeness remains constitutionally
permissible. In part this is a recognition of the limits of governmental resources (the government could
hardly publish such surveys for every product on the market), and the fact that government regulation by
Doctrine, The Physician-Patient Relationship, and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 993 (2001); Yonni D.
Fushman, Case Comment: Perez v. Wyeth Labs, Inc.: Toward Creating a Direct-to-Consumer Advertisement Exception to the
Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1161 (2000); Bradford B. Lear, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Age
of Direct Consumer Advertising, 65 Mo. L. Rev. 1101 (2000); Mae Joanne Rosok, Comment: Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
of Prescription Drugs: After a Decade of Speculation, Courts Consider Another Exception to the Learned Intermediary Rule,
24 Seattle L. Rev. 629 (2000).
40and large targets misleading advertising, which does not in fact enjoy First Amendment protection. If the
Constitution provides diﬀerential protection depending on commercial speech’s truthfulness, then it must
permit the government to separate the wheat from the chaﬀ, or else the diﬀerential protection becomes a
nullity.
Other alternatives certainly exist, but the evaluation of the representative approaches considered above
suggests that as long as the FDA assembles enough of the existing evidence about how misleading ads aﬀect
doctors and patients, and particularly about doctors’ shortcomings as gatekeepers, pre-approval should pass
constitutional muster.
At the same time, if pre-approval does deter lawful advertising, it may be that requiring pre-approval of
ads targeting professionals is more constitutionally suspect than requiring pre-approval of DTC advertising.
Regulation of medical journal advertising is necessarily underinclusive, and a more inclusive approach would
likely violate the First Amendment. Most of the promotion to professionals does not involve medical journal
advertisements, but rather the activities of detailers and the industry sponsorship of “educational” events,
studies, and literature. It is a complex question, beyond the scope of this Article, to what extent the
Constitution permits the FDA to regulate these activities, but as a general matter the more speech partakes
of exchange of scientiﬁc information, the less the FDA can regulate it. While regulation of print ads targeting
professionals directly advances the government’s substantial interest in preventing the most egregious forms
of misinformation, because of physicians’ technical knowledge, access to scientiﬁc information, and exposure
to other more constitutionally protected forms of promotion, there may be a point beyond which the Court
would require the government to rely more on such mechanisms as physician education, publication and
distribution of reports comparing medicines, and so on. It is diﬃcult to see why the line should be drawn
41between pre-approval and the current regime, but wherever the Court draws a line, it may well be at a
diﬀerent place than for DTC advertising.
Before closing, brief mention should be made of the issues surrounding the Internet. While the Internet in
some ways presents unique issues, it does seem that it can reasonably be ﬁtted within the regulatory schemes
already discussed. In particular, there are few relevant diﬀerences between Internet promotion and print
advertisements, except perhaps in terms of separating “promotion” from “scientiﬁc exchange.”
VII. Conclusion
Although prescription drug advertising may have substantial beneﬁts, and the Constitution places limits
on the extent to which the FDA can regulate it, the FDA needs to do more to battle such advertising’s
tendency to promote inappropriate prescribing practices. Pre-approval would be one highly eﬀective means
of improving the quality of prescription drug information available to patients and doctors, and it would
pass constitutional muster, at least if the FDA justiﬁed it with suﬃcient empirical information and limited
delay in approving advertisements. Whatever regulatory approach the FDA ultimately adopts, it should
require prescription drug advertisements to be more informative, and Congress should provide the FDA
with suﬃcient resources to carry out its regulatory mandate.
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